Faster, Fairer Antitrust? A Look at India's Proposed Settlement and Commitment Regulations

Authors

  • Akshay Pathak National Law Institute University, Bhopal 462044, India

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.69971/tipr.3.1.2025.39

Keywords:

Settlement, Commitment, interim relief, cartel, appeal

Abstract

Antitrust laws play a crucial role in fostering healthy competition, benefiting consumers through lower prices, better choices, and increased innovation. However, the mechanism of competition regulation in India often faces a harsh reality with lengthy investigations and protracted litigation. Amidst concerns about the effectiveness of the antitrust regime, many stakeholders have been clamoring for a revision of the Competition Act, advocating for a more credible antitrust watchdog and a fair competitive landscape in India. To this end, the competition commission of India (CCI) has introduced the draft regulations for settlement and commitment proceedings, overhauling the substantive and procedural framework of the competition law regime in India. The draft regulations are expected to mark a turning point for tech giants under investigation, granting them an avenue to settle disputes while streamlining regulatory processes and encouraging corrections within the market. However, several key aspects of the draft regulations remain shrouded in ambiguities and concerns. These include the absence of interim relief provisions for third parties during settlements, no provision for appeal after the final settlement/commitment order, the exclusion of cartel cases, meager settlement discount, and the CCI’s unfettered discretion to use the applicant’s information against them. This research outlines the challenges of the traditional antitrust enforcement regime and highlights the emergence of the settlement and commitment regulations as a potential solution. However, it also identifies potential loopholes and challenges in implementing the regulations effectively. The research draws insights from established settlement and commitment mechanisms in other jurisdictions like the EU and the UK proposing suggestions for India’s approach.

References

Hellwig Michael, Hüschelrath Kai, Laitenberger Ulrich. 2018. Settlements and appeals in the European Commission’s cartel cases: An empirical assessment. Review of Industrial Organization 52:55-84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9572-1

Hüschelrath Kai, Laitenberger Ulrich. 2017. The Settlement procedure in the European Commission’s cartel cases: an early evaluation.Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 5:458–487. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnw015

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Published

29-04-2025

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Faster, Fairer Antitrust? A Look at India’s Proposed Settlement and Commitment Regulations. (2025). Trends in Intellectual Property Research, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.69971/tipr.3.1.2025.39